Als die Besatzung des US-Spionageflugzeuges, das am 1. April auf der Insel Hainan notgelandet war, in die USA zurückkehren durfte, behauptete ein Crew-Mitglied, Gott habe das Flugzeug (nicht den "Flieger") gelenkt. Dem traut er offenbar wenig zu, sonst hätte es doch besser (ohne toten Chinesen WANG WEI [Bild], Notlandung und Haft) ausgehen müssen:
In the United States, a welcome ceremony was held in a huge aircraft hangar at the Whidbey Island Naval Air Station. Bunting was strewn throughout the hangar, dominated by a very large American flag hanging on one wall of the structure.
With a crowd of family members and Navy sailors and brass just a short distance away, the crew members left the aircraft to loud and emotional cheers. They walked across a red carpet and shook hands with dignitaries standing on the tarmac. Emotional hugs and kisses prompted more cheering from the crowd as crew members were reunited with spouses and children. Many of the crew members were greeted by loved ones wearing yellow ribbons and waving American flags.
Rear Adm. VINSON SMITH offered an official welcome home to the servicemen and women, followed by Rear Adm. MICHAEL HOLMES, who credited pilot Lt. SHANE OSBORN with saving the lives of his crew. During brief remarks, OSBORN thanked God, "because it was definitely Him flying that plane" [Hervorhebung von mir, N.S.] along with those responsible for the crew's return.
Nun weiß ich ja, das die Amis spinnen, gerade in religiösen Fragen, aber ich möchte heute nicht darauf eingehen, sondern den Vorfall zum Anlaß nehmen, zwei Spionagefälle auf See vorzustellen, bei denen sich die USA ganz unterschiedlich verhielten.
Am 22.11.1963 wurde JOHN F. KENNEDY ermordet. Nicht mal ein Jahr später griff die USA massiv in den Vietnamkrieg ein und nutzte dabei einen Vorfall, bei dem niemand verletzt wurde. Betroffen war die USS Maddox, und zwar das dritte Schiff, das diesen Namen trug.
The third MADDOX (DD-731), a short hull (DD-696) class was built by Bath Iron Works Corporation. At the launching on 19 March 1944 she was sponsored by Mrs. ELLEN VELITA BROWNING Willhoit Gay of Washington D.C., gread grand daughter of Captain WILLIAM ALFRED MADDOX.
After the Korean Conflict, MADDOX frequently operated as a member of the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific area. In June 1963, MADDOX underwent a shipyard overhaul followed by seven weeks of extensive underway training during October and November 1963.
MADDOX was again deployed in the Western Pacific from 13 March 1964 to 2 October 1964. During this time the MADDOX operated with the fast Carrier Task Force Seventh-Seven, and during the seven month deployment she screened five different heavy attack aircraft carriers. During the early part of August 1964, MADDOX was assigned special patrol duty in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam. On the second of August she earned the distinction of being the first U.S. Warship to be fired upon since the Korean War. While on patrol duty, MADDOX was attacked by several North Vietnamese torpedo patrol boats. She answered the challenge with her five inch and three inch gun battteries sinking one torpedo boat and damaging the other two. She was again attacked on the night of 4 August by an undetermined number of torpedo boats. [Das stimmt wohl nicht, N.S.]
Eine mehr oder weniger der damaligen US-offiziellen Darstellung folgende Beschreibung des Vorfall findet ihr beim Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club.
Heading southeast on the afternoon of August 2, after patrolling in international waters, MADDOX was attacked by three PT boats. The high speed vessels launched at least 4 torpedos and fired their 14.5 mm deck guns at the ship. The "fish" missed, but one 14.5 mm round put a hole in the destroyer's superstructure. American gunners hit and slowed one of the motor torpedo boats.
Suddently, four F-8 Crusaders screamed over MADDOX at 400 knots and made for the enemy vessels, by now heading away from the destroyer and miles north of her. The jets were led by Commander JAMES B. STOCKDALE. He and his fellow F-8 pilots from TICONDEROGA were conducting practice firing runs near the ship when the radio call went out to fly to the assistance of MADDOX. They covered the 300 miles to the destroyer in one-half hour.[...]
For the next two days, MADDOX, now accompanied by destroyer TURNER JOY, continued to patrol along the North vietnamese coast. Then on the night of August 4th, the North Vietnamese struck again. About 70 miles off the coast, communist naval vessels launched several torpedos at TURNER JOY, again the torpedos missed. The destroyers opened fire with their 5-inch and 3-inch guns, firing 249 shells, and sinking or damaging several of the hostile craft.
Captain HERRICK, alerted of the enemy's approach by ships radar, called for immediate air support. Within minutes TICONDEROGA catapulted her ready aircraft into the inky blackness. First two A-1H SkyRaiders and one F-8 Crusader, followed by two A-4D SkyHawks and another four A-1H's. A total of 16 aircraft were launched from TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION, the latter ship steaming at flank speed from Hong Kong.
Once the aircraft arrived at the destroyers location, they began to circle the ships, and swooping in on areas of reported enemy activity. The night was overcast and pitch-black and visibility was extremely poor. But several pilots did manage to see the snake-like wake of high speed vessels; dark objects on the surface between the destroyers, that soon moved off into the cloaking void, or gun flashes and light bursts at their altitude, which would indicate enemy antiaircrat fire.
By the early morning of the 5th, the action was over. Both destroyers were approaching the mouth of the Gulf, and dispatching reports about the North Vietnamese Navy's second attack on th US Seventh Fleet. Much to the surprise of American leaders, both civilian and military, rather than backing down in the face of US military pressure and curtailing their actions against South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese regime had resisted. Following the consultation of his National Security Council, President JOHNSON ordered a one-time reprisal strike, code-named Pierce Arrow, by carrier aircraft.
In Wirklichkeit wurde die Maddox wohl nur am 2. August 1964 angegriffen, und da war sie der vietnamesischen Küste recht nah. Nordvietnam proklamierte später eine 12-Meilen-Zone, dann wäre der Zerstörer drin gewesen, aber zu dem Zeitpunkt gingen die USA von einer Drei-Meilen-Zone aus (wovon sonst?), und so nah war die Maddox der Küste nicht. Was hatte sie da zu suchen:
Rather than being on a routine patrol Aug. 2, the U.S. destroyer Maddox was actually engaged in aggressive intelligence-gathering maneuvers -- in sync with coordinated attacks on North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese navy and the Laotian air force.
"The day before, two attacks on North Vietnam...had taken place," writes scholar DANIEL C. HALLIN. Those assaults were "part of a campaign of increasing military pressure on the North that the United States had been pursuing since early 1964."
On the night of Aug. 4, the Pentagon proclaimed that a second attack by North Vietnamese PT boats had occurred earlier that day in the Tonkin Gulf -- a report cited by President JOHNSON as he went on national TV that evening to announce a momentous escalation in the war: air strikes against North Vietnam.
But JOHNSON ordered U.S. bombers to "retaliate" for a North Vietnamese torpedo attack that never happened.
Prior to the U.S. air strikes, top officials in Washington had reason to doubt that any Aug. 4 attack by North Vietnam had occurred. Cables from the U.S. task force commander in the Tonkin Gulf, Captain JOHN J. HERRICK, referred to "freak weather effects," "almost total darkness" and an "overeager sonarman" who "was hearing ship's own propeller beat."
One of the Navy pilots flying overhead that night was squadron commander JAMES STOCKDALE, who gained fame later as a POW and then ROSS PEROT's vice presidential candidate. "I had the best seat in the house to watch that event," recalled STOCKDALE a few years ago, "and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets -- there were no PT boats there.... There was nothing there but black water and American fire power."
In 1965, LYNDON JOHNSON commented: "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there."
Media Beat, July 27, 1994
30-Year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam War
By JEFF COHEN and NORMAN SOLOMON
Versehentlich Wale oder Wolken zu beschießen kann schon mal passieren. Die schwedische Marine war z.B. bekannt dafür, oft sowjetische U-Boote zu vermuten, gefunden hat sie aber keines.
Auch Details des Zwischenfalls am 2. August sind fragwürdig (Abstand zur Küste, Warnschüsse):
The camouflage of the Tonkin gulf
By DICK DETTREY (DICK DETTREY is a Vietnam Veteran, 1964 - 1966. )
Whether or not the USS Maddox was in international waters remains a mystery for the U.S. claimed that the USS Maddox was within ten or less miles of offshore islands five times between 31 Jul 64 and the first Tonkin Gulf incident on 2 Aug 64. The United States recognized a three-mile territorial limit at that time. However, North Vietnam claimed a twelve-mile boundary, but that claim was not made public until Sep 64. [...]
There is yet another mystery of the Tonkin Gulf and that is the sequence of events on 2 Aug 64. Admiral MOORER testified that the USS Maddox opened fire only after she came under torpedo attack. However, the record shows that the USS Maddox commenced fire at 9,000 yards after firing initial warning shots. The Navy¹s official history shows that the USS Maddox made a positive identification of the PT boats at 9,800 yards, and assumed that they launched the first torpedo somewhere between 9,000 and 5,000 yards.[...]
Die offizielle Darstellung des Tonkin-Zwischenfalls ist in jüngster Zeit durch zwei Bücher widerlegt worden:
By Captain RONNIE E. FORD, U.S. Army [war auch in der Aufklärung und hat ebenfalls ein Buch über Vietnam geschrieben, N.S.]
The claim that the administration of President LYNDON JOHNSON deliberately triggered the Vietnam War by orchestrating the Tonkin Gulf incident and duping Congress is not a new one. Two recent books--SEDGWICK TOURISON's Secret Army, Secret War (reviewed in the February 1997 Vietnam) and Dr. EDWIN MOISE's Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War--and other new revelations may indicate, however, that the claim is certainly more plausible than could once be proved. Thirty-three years after the fact, modern Tonkin Gulf researchers pointedly ask: Did the United States intentionally instigate the first attack on USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964? Did Hanoi actually order a second attack on Maddox on August 4, 1964? And, if the Communist Vietnamese did not launch this second attack, then did Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MCNAMARA knowingly and deliberately mislead the U.S. Congress to obtain support for what would become the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, to ensure President JOHNSON's re-election and ultimately lead the United States into war?
The story of former South Vietnamese special operation forces, part of an American covert intelligence effort known as Operation Plan 34A (or 34 Alpha), is finally coming to light. Details about the plan are now available, thanks to the release of once-classified documents and disclosures by former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military intelligence officials.
[...] DeSoto patrols were U.S. naval intelligence collection operations using specially equipped vessels to gather electronic signals intelligence from shore-and island-based noncommunications emitters in North Vietnam. By August 2, 1964, the Communist Vietnamese had determined that the DeSoto vessels were offshore support for a 34-Alpha operation that had struck their installations at Hon Me and Hon Ngu some 48 hours earlier. In retaliation, the North Vietnamese then conducted an "unprovoked attack" on Maddox, which was approximately 30 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. During the battle that ensued, one North Vietnamese patrol boat was severely damaged by Maddox, and two others were attacked and chased off by U.S. air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga.
On August 4, 1964, Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy reported a second attack, this one occurring within 17 hours of 34-Alpha raids on North Vietnamese facilities at Cap Vinh Son and Cua Ron. On that day the National Security Agency (NSA) had warned that an attack on Maddox appeared imminent. An hour after the NSA's warning, Maddox claimed that she had established radar contact with three or four unidentified vessels approaching at high speed. Ticonderoga soon launched aircraft to assist Maddox and C. Turner Joy. Low clouds and thunderstorms reportedly made visibility very poor for the aircraft, and the pilots never confirmed the presence of any North Vietnamese attackers. During the next several hours, the ships reported more than 20 torpedo attacks, the visual sighting of torpedo wakes, searchlight illumination, automatic-weapons fire, and radar and sonar contact.
Despite the recommendation of Captain JOHN J. HERRICK, the recently assigned senior officer on board Maddox, that the circumstances--including darkness, stormy seas and nervous, inexperienced crewmen--warranted a "thorough investigation," Secretary of Defense MCNAMARA told Congress there was "unequivocal proof" of the second "unprovoked attack" on U.S. ships. Within hours of MCNAMARA's revelations, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and the United States plunged into the only war it has ever lost.
MCNAMARA's account, backed by the JOHNSON administration, did not go unchallenged. Before a joint executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee debating full congressional support for the resolution, Senator WAYNE MORSE (D-Ore.), who had already dubbed the conflict "MCNAMARA's War," declared: "I am unalterably opposed to this course of action which, in my judgment, is an aggressive course of action on the part of the United States. I think you are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated." Senator MORSE also noted that the American vessels were "conveniently standing by" as support for 34-Alpha operations.
In response, MCNAMARA denied any U.S. naval involvement in the South Vietnamese-run operations, asserting that the DeSoto operations were neither support nor cover for 34-Alpha raids. TOURISON sets the record straight on this issue. "The MarOps [maritime operations] were not CIA-supported South Vietnamese operations that the United States had no control over as former Secretary of Defense MCNAMARA claimed," writes TOURISON. "These operations were under U.S. control, not South Vietnamese."
MCNAMARA also claimed that the Maddox crew had no knowledge of the 34-Alpha raids. MCNAMARA now acknowledges that this claim was untrue, although he maintains that he did not know it at the time. Captain HERRICK and his crew did indeed know of the 34-Alpha operations.[...]
On August 7, 1964, the Senate passed support for Tonkin Gulf Resolution 88-2, with Senators MORSE and ERNEST GRUENING (D-Alaska) voting nay. The House voted 4160 in support. Prophetically, Senator MORSE closed his argument by saying, "I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake."
Immerhin sind inzwischen die Umstände bekannt geworden. Das geht in den USA schneller als hierzulande, wo selbst bei Stasiakten die ausnahmsweise beschlossene freizügigere Regelung ins Wanken gekommen ist.
In 1972, LOUIS TORDELLA, the deputy director of the NSA, announced that the decoded message on which the NSA's August 4 warning to Maddox had been based actually referred to the original attack on August 2. And the "unequivocal proof" of the second attack consisted of decrypted North Vietnamese damage assessments of the first attack (August 2) that were presented to top-level U.S. decision-makers as the alleged second attack was being reported to the Pentagon. According to a U.S. News and World Report exposé, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence RAY S. CLINE verified this series of mistakes in 1984. Given the extreme volitality and pressure of the situation, the fact that some decision-makers were confused by intercepts suggesting two attacks is understandable. That they acted so quickly on rash assumptions--removing the chance for necessary debate and analysis--added insult to injury in an already untenable decision climate. [...]
Understandably, in the United States the Vietnam War as a whole and the Tonkin Gulf Incident in particular remain topics of widely ranging interpretation and debate. MCNAMARA recently visited Hanoi, where he met with Communist Vietnamese Senior General VO NGUYEN GIAP. MCNAMARA also invited the Vietnamese to participate in a conference of top Vietnam War decision-makers to, according to press reports of the visit, "correct the historical record." During his visit, GIAP told MCNAMARA that "absolutely nothing" happened on August 4, 1964. MCNAMARA later endorsed this statement by his former adversary.
In his recent book, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, MCNAMARA admits that the United States "may have provoked a North Vietnamese response in the Tonkin Gulf," albeit innocently. He maintains, however, that "charges of a cloak of deception surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident are unfounded. The idea that the JOHNSON administration deliberately deceived Congress is fake." Many disagree. Coincidentally, on the very day MCNAMARA was in Hanoi, American veterans, historians and scholars met in Washington, D.C., for a conference sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Institute.[...]
In 1977, former Under Secretary of State GEORGE BALL claimed in an interview televised by the British Broadcasting Corporation: "Many of the people associated with the war...were looking for any excuse to initiate bombing. The DeSoto Patrols were primarily for provocation....There was a feeling that if the destroyer got into trouble, that would provide the provocation needed." [...]
So viel zu den Fakten, ich fasse sie mal zusammen:
Hier die Texte von JOHNSONs Ansprache und der Kongress-Resolution.
|President JOHNSON's Message to Congress August 5, 1964
Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.
After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.
These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime has given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President EISENHOWER. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.
This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.
Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:
The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations - all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.
In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening...
As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.
As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos...
|Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145 August 7, 1964
(Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964)
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
Die Resolution war eine Art Ermächtigungsgesetz ("to take all necessary measures") Beim öffentlichen Rundfunk hieß es dazu:
Um die beiden demokratischen Politiker zu ehren, die dagegen stimmten, nenne ich nochmal ihre Namen: Senator WAYNE MORSE (Oregon) und Senator ERNEST GRUENING (Alaska)
Nun zu den Motiven. Letztlich hätten die USA es einfacher gehabt, wenn sie nicht in den Vietnamkrieg verwickelt gewesen wären. Schon im Juli 1965 waren 80.000 US-Soldaten in Vietnam, im Frühjahr 1969 543.000 (der Höchststand), die täglich 400 Tonnen Bomben verbrauchten. (The Gulf of Tonkin Incident 1964). Über 58.000 US-AmerikanerInnen und 4 Mio. VietnamesInnen mußten sterben.
Wer hatte was von einer Eskalation? Daß der "militärisch-industrielle Komplex" die Politik instrumentalisiert, ist zwar schon bekannt, allerdings scheint zumindest der Geheimdienst die Situation richtig eingeschätzt zu haben. Sogar auf der Homepage der CIA kann man nachlesen, daß der Geheimdienst den nordvietnamesischen Angriff verständnisvoll beurteilte:
Within a week's time, events in the Gulf of Tonkin changed the situation. In early August, in response to what were perceived as attacks by DRV patrol boats on the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy, US Navy planes bombed military targets along 100 miles of North Vietnam's coastline, and President JOHNSON had whiffed his long-prepared Joint Resolution through the Congress.(144)
August-October 1964 saw more heated backstage policy debate on whether to "go North," principally between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The JCS maintained that only airstrikes against the North could save the South; others who held similar views included MACV General WESTMORELAND, Secretary of State RUSK, MCGEORGE BUNDY, and WALT ROSTOW. By contrast, MCNAMARA insisted that the prime requirement remained stability in the South, and that bombing the North would not ensure that result; weighing in with similar arguments were Ambassador MAXWELL TAYLOR and his Saigon country team, the Pentagon's International Security Affairs bureau, and State's WILLIAM BUNDY. These conflicting arguments were aired during a September-October interagency policy examination led by DoD/ISA, which specifically revisited WALT ROSTOW's thesis that bombing the North would save the South.(145) The President and his senior advisers, who might have entered or refereed the debate, were besieged at this time by more pressing developments external to Vietnam, chief among them the fall of Soviet Premier KHRUSHCHEV, Communist China's detonation of a nuclear device, crises in Africa, and--not least--President JOHNSON's race against what he termed "the war candidate," Senator Barry Goldwater.
Although they were not major participants in the Vietnam strategy debates, DCI MCCONE and his officers did not hesitate to offer numerous judgments concerning related events and policy issues. On 4 August, at the height of the argument over how to respond to the Tonkin Gulf attacks, MCCONE told the President and the NSC that those attacks had been a defensive reaction by the North Vietnamese to prior covert gunboat raids (part of OPLAN 34A) on North Vietnamese islands: "They are responding out of pride and on the basis of defense considerations." [Hervorhebungen von mir, N.S.] In the DCI's view, the North Vietnamese attacks did not "represent a deliberate decision to provoke or accept a major escalation of the Vietnamese war," but were a signal to the United States that Hanoi was determined to continue the war and was "raising the ante."(146)
|Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Episode 2, 1963-1965:
CIA Judgments on President JOHNSON's Decision To "Go Big" in Vietnam
(Ein wirklich ausführlicher Text, ausgedruckt 35 Seiten,
Schon am 25 November l963 hatte Geheimdienstler ["DCI", was "DCI", "DCT" und "DDCI" bedeuten, habe ich leider nicht herausgefunden. Für Hinweise bin ich dankbar, N.S.] JOHN MCCONE, notiert:
Alles spricht dafür, daß vor allem der durch JOHN F. KENNEDYs Ermordung plötzlich in dieses Amt gekommene Präsident LYNDON B. JOHNSON von der Eskalation profitierte. Er konnte sich aber nicht als Kriegpolitiker verkaufen, weil er den Wahlkampf anders angelegt hatte. Also mußte er sich nach außen hin zum Krieg zwingen (lassen). Das war aber schon vor dem Tonkin-Zwischenfall geplant:
Interestingly, a resolution stating, "Upon request of South Vietnam or the Laotian government to use all measures including the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces in their Defense"--the very resolution that became the Tonkin Gulf Resolution--had been prepared in May 1964, three months before the "unprovoked attacks" ever occurred. At the time, JOHNSON was running his presidential campaign on a peace ticket. JOHNSON's main opponent for the presidency, Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, was pushing for an even tougher U.S. stance in Southeast Asia. An "unprovoked attack" by North Vietnam would give JOHNSON the opportunity to respond with limited force and improve his image with the American people without appearing to agree with his main political opponent, a man the JOHNSON administration was busy painting as a candidate who would potentially lead the country into a nuclear war.
If this line of thinking was part of JOHNSON's plan, it was well-calculated. In response to the Tonkin Gulf attacks, the president launched a limited airstrike and warned Hanoi against further aggression. Thus, four months prior to the November election, he appeared firm but not a warmonger. His approval rating with the American people soared from 42 percent to 72 percent, and within three months he overwhelmingly won his campaign for the presidency. [Hervorhebung von mir, N.S.]
Ob die Bombenanschläge auf Wohnhäuser vor der Wahl PUTINs zum russischen Präsidenten wirklich von tschetschenischen Rebellen verübt wurden, kann auch bezweifelt werden.
Hat man daraus gelernt? Zum Teil: Präsident GEORGE BUSH hat sich die Zustimmung des Kongresses zur Entsendung von Truppen in den Golf-Krieg geholt. Aber wahrheitsgetreue Berichterstattung wurde auch bei späteren Konflikten vermieden (Ich denke an die Brutkästen-Geschichte der Tochter des Kuwaitischen Botschafters und der dreimal so schnell abgespielte wie aufgenommene Film von der Bombardierung einer serbischen Brücke, über die gerade ein Zug fuhr). Einige Beteiligte würden so etwas nie wieder tun:
DANIEL ELLSBERG, at the November 1995 Vietnam Veterans Institute Conference [...]: "What I did not reveal in the Summer of 64...was a conspiracy to manipulate the public into a war and to win an election through fraud...which had the exact horrible consequences the founders of this country envisioned when they ruled out, they thought as best they could, that an Executive Branch could secretly decide the decisions of war and peace, without public debate or vote of Congress....Senator Morse, one of the two people who voted against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution told me in 1971, '...had you given us all that information...seven years earlier, in 1964, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would never have gotten out of Committee. And, if it had, it would never have passed....' But there was a time in my life later...knowing the consequences of all these policies...when I did say to myself that I'm never going to lie again with the justification that someone has told me I have to....I've never been sorry I've stopped doing that."
New Light on Gulf of Tonkin (s.o.)
Es kann durchaus noch einiges herauskommen, denn noch sind die zugänglichen Dokumente lückenhaft oder verwirrend, wie KIM WEITZMAN feststellen mußte:
After researching the declassified documents of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the realization that much information is missing led to a request for the intercepted communications. A FOIA request to the Naval Security Group for all intercepted communications ended in no information provided. The NSG reported that the request had been sent to the National Security Agency who has yet to respond.(43) After seven months, there has been no confirmation that the information exists, if it is classified, or if it is available. These records, so vital to the Secretary of Defense and all US retaliatory actions, at this point do not exist.
An important document that adds much to the scenario of the Tonkin Gulf incidents is the MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY. This document, declassified in 1992, explains the nature and activities of both the South Vietnamese Oplan 34A program and US naval action during 1964.(44) While this document is declassified, it is not contained in the Tonkin Gulf file in the Naval Historical Center nor the National Archives. For the last thirty years the relationship between the Oplan 34A and Desoto Patrols has been a source of much confusion. The MACSOG study explains that the "Primary objectives [of the Oplan operations] were the collection of intelligence and reconnaissance of the NVN coastal area."(45) This explanation is identical to the description of the Desoto Patrol operations.(46)
Spending countless hours studying the declassified record of the August events, there is little information that supports the actions taken by the U.S. on 5 August and in regards to the passing of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The presented account, as detailed by declassified government records, leaves a confusing picture of what transpired in the gulf. Expecting to understand the events that impacted on subsequent actions in Vietnam, it is sad to conclude that is not possible. The limitations and confusion faced by researchers dealing with the period are reflected in the lack of serious study available today explaining the incidents. Most histories of the Vietnam War include a short explanation of the attacks, but a full account of the pre-Tonkin Gulf Resolution period does not exist. Assuming this was simply due to a lack of interest in the period, it is soon realized that the lack of academic attention is caused by the inability to understand the released information.
Are there reasons why government agencies will not provide access to information that would fill an important void? Two assumptions can be made. Firstly, if the government is holding information that does not support their rendition of the events, they are more likely to keep that information classified. Secondly, if evidence used as a basis for retaliatory actions and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution does not exist then the government would not be able to declassify that information. Rather then demand reckless declassifications that would interfere with national security issues, the agencies which hold the full account of the Tonkin Gulf incidents should release enough information to provide historians a clear understanding of actions taken.
How can the American public intelligently understand the events of the Vietnam War when government agencies refuses to provide a rational, believable account of the events that led to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War? A more honest account of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, which served as the framework for critical decisions concerning Vietnam, is necessary to repel the criticisms of the Vietnam period.
Die USS Liberty war ein Spionageschiff. Weil die USA bekanntlich auch ihre Verbündeten bespitzeln (ECHELON), kreuzte es beim 6-Tage-Krieg vor der Sinai-Halbinsel, angeblich wieder in internationalen Gewässern. Dafür spricht wohl, daß die Besatzung am 8. Juli 1967 arglos war, badete, sich sonnte.
'Liberty,' a World War II freighter, had been converted into an intelligence vessel by the top-secret US National Security Agency, and packed with the latest signals and electronic interception equipment. The ship bristled with antennas and electronic 'ears' including TRSSCOMM, a system that delivered real-time intercepts to Washington by bouncing a stream of microwaves off the moon.
'Liberty' had been rushed to Sinai to monitor communications of the belligerents in the Third Arab Israeli War: Israel and her foes, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
At 0800 hrs, 8 June, 1967, eight Israeli recon flights flew over 'Liberty,' which was flying a large American flag. At 1400 hrs, waves of low-flying Israeli Mystere and Mirage-III fighter-bombers repeatedly attacked the American vessel with rockets, napalm, and cannon. The air attacks lasted 20 minutes, concentrating on the ship's electronic antennas and dishes. The 'Liberty' was left afire, listing sharply. Eight of her crew lay dead, a hundred seriously wounded, including the captain, Commander WILLIAM MCGONAGLE.
At 1424 hrs, three Israeli torpedo boats attacked, raking the burning 'Liberty' with 20mm and 40mm shells. At 1431hrs an Israeli torpedo hit the 'Liberty' midship, precisely where the signals intelligence systems were located. Twenty-five more Americans died.
Israeli gunboats circled the wounded 'Liberty,' firing at crewmen trying to fight the fires. At 1515, the crew were ordered to abandon ship. The Israeli warships closed and poured machine gun fire into the crowded life rafts, sinking two. As American sailors were being massacred in cold blood, a rescue mission by US Sixth Fleet carrier aircraft was mysteriously aborted on orders from the White House.
An hour after the attack, Israeli warships and planes returned. Commander MCGONAGLE gave the order. 'prepare to repel borders.' But the Israelis, probably fearful of intervention by the US Sixth Fleet, departed. 'Liberty' was left shattered but still defiant, her flag flying.
The Israeli attacks killed 34 US seamen and wounded 171 out of a crew of 297, the worst loss of American naval personnel from hostile action since World War II.
Less than an hour after the attack, Israel told Washington its forces had committed a 'tragic error.' Later, Israel claimed it had mistaken 'Liberty' for an ancient Egyptian horse transport. US Secretary of State, DEAN RUSK, and Joint Chiefs of Staff head, Admiral THOMAS MOORER, insisted the Israeli attack was deliberate and designed to sink 'Liberty.' So did three CIA reports; one asserted Israel's Defense Minister, Gen. MOSHE DAYAN, had personally ordered the attack.
In contrast to American outrage over North Korea's assault on the intelligence ship 'Pueblo,' Iraq's mistaken missile strike on the USS 'Stark,' last fall's bombing of the USS 'Cole' in Aden, and the recent US-China air incident, the savaging of 'Liberty' was quickly hushed up by President LYNDON JOHNSON and Defense Secretary ROBERT MCNAMARA.
The White House and Congress immediately accepted Israel's explanation and let the matter drop. Israel later paid a token reparation of US $6 million. There were reports two Israeli pilots who had refused to attack 'Liberty' were jailed for 18 years.
Surviving 'Liberty' crew members would not be silenced. They kept demanding an open inquiry and tried to tell their story of deliberate attack to the media. Israel's government worked behind the scenes to thwart these efforts, going so far as having American pro-Israel groups accuse 'Liberty's' survivors of being 'anti-Semites' and 'Israel-haters.' Major TV networks cancelled interviews with the crew. A book about the 'Liberty' by crewman JAMES ENNES' was dropped from distribution. The Israel lobby branded him 'an Arab propagandist.'
'The USS Liberty': America's Most Shameful Secret by ERIC S. MARGOLIS May 2, 2001
ERIC MARGOLIS is foreign correspondent for the Toronto Sun. [Hervorhebungen von mir, N.S.]
Das Beschießen eigener Leute oder Geräte wird als "friendly fire" bezeichnet, und so stellt es Israel heute noch dar, allerdings passen die hervorgehobenen Fakten nicht so dazu, sondern lassen eher den Eindruck aufkommen, das es Absicht war. Wieso sollte aber Israel ein amerikanisches Schiff und sogar seine Rettungsboote beschießen (Das mit den Rettungsbooten wäre ja sogar bei einem ägyptischen Schiff ein Kriegsverbrechen)? Dazu komme ich später, erst sollen noch Überlebende zu Wort kommen. Die errichteten im Internet das USS Liberty Memorial
Torpedoloch im Trockendock auf Malta
We were in international waters, far from any fighting, and flew a bright, clean, new American flag. The flag we flew is on display at the National Cryptologic Museum, Fort Meade, Maryland and can be seen there, or in the USS Liberty Images Archive.
Our commanding officer, Captain William Loren MCGONAGLE, received the Congressional Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepedity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty during the attack. The Congressional Medal of Honor is the highest award our country can bestow. To avoid embarrassing our attackers, Captain MCGONAGLE's Medal of Honor was presented in a quiet ceremony in the Washington Navy Yard instead of in the White House by the President as is customary.
The USS Liberty Memorial Web Site is a creation of JIM ENNES and JOE MEADORS, survivors of the attack, with support and encouragement from the USS Liberty Veterans Association and special help from JOHN GIDUSKO and GARY HARVEY
JOE was a signalman on the bridge during the attack and is a former chairman and president of the USS Liberty Veterans Association
JIM was an officer on the bridge when the attack started and is author of Assault on the Liberty (Random House 1980; Ballantine 1986) which tells the story.
Weitere Fotos zeigt das USS LIBERTY PHOTO ALBUM.
Wie Israel den Angriff darstellt, und was die US-Regierung davon als eigene Darstellung übernommen hat, zeigt die Jewish virtual library, a division of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise.
The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was a grievous error, largely attributable to the fact that it occurred in the midst of the confusion of a full-scale war in 1967. Ten official United States investigations and three official Israeli inquiries have all conclusively established the attack was a tragic mistake.
[...] The United States had announced that it had no Naval forces within hundreds of miles of the battle front on the floor of the United Nations a few days earlier; however, the USS Liberty, an American intelligence ship assigned to monitor the fighting, arrived in the area, 14 miles off the Sinai coast, as result of a series of United States communication failures, whereby messages directing the ship not to approach within 100 miles were not received by the Liberty. The Israelis mistakenly thought this was the ship doing the shelling and war planes and torpedo boats attacked, killing 34 members of the Liberty's crew and wounding 171.
Numerous mistakes were made by both the United States and Israel. For example, the Liberty was first reported incorrectly, as it turned out (it was later recalculated to be 28 knots) to be cruising at 30 knots. Under Israeli (and U.S.) naval doctrine at the time, a ship proceeding at that speed was presumed to be a warship. [...] The sea was calm and the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry found that the flag was very likely drooped and not discernible; moreover, members of the crew, including the Captain, Commander WILLIAM MCGONAGLE, testified that the flag was knocked down after the first or second assault. [...] When the Liberty began shooting at the Israelis, they responded with the torpedo attack, which killed 28 of the sailors.[...]
None of Israel's accusers has been able to explain adequately why Israel would have deliberately attacked an American ship at a time when the United States was Israel's only friend and supporter in the world.
Accidents caused by friendly fire are common in wartime. In 1988, the U.S. Navy mistakenly downed an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 civilians. During the Gulf War, 35 of the 148 Americans who died in battle were killed by friendly fire. In April 1994, two U.S. Black Hawk helicpoters with large U.S. flags painted on each side were shot down by U.S. Air Force F-15s on a clear day in the no fly zone of Iraq, killing 26 people. In fact, the day before the Liberty was attacked, Israeli pilots accidentally bombed one of their own armored columns south of Jenin on the West Bank.6 [...]
Secretary of Defense Robert MCNAMARA told Congress [den er schon mal belogen hatte, s.o., N.S.] on July 26, 1967: It was the conclusion of the investigatory body, headed by an admiral of the Navy in whom we have great confidence, that the attack was not intentional.
In 1987, MCNAMARA repeated his belief that the attack was a mistake, telling a caller on the Larry King Show that he had seen nothing in the 20 years since to change his mind that there had been no coverup.7
Israel apologized for the tragedy and paid nearly $13 million in humanitarian reparations to the United States and to the families of the victims in amounts established by the U.S. State Department. The matter was officially closed between the two government by an exchange of diplomatic notes on December 17, 1987.
Schon früher wurden an dieser offiziösen Darstellung Fragen gestellt, die sie nicht beantworten konnte, z.B.
The pilot's protests also were heard by radio monitors in the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon DWIGHT PORTER has confirmed this. PORTER told his story to syndicated columnists ROWLAND EVANS and ROBERT NOVAK and offered to submit to further questioning by authorities. Unfortunately, no one in the U.S. government has any interest in hearing these first-person accounts of Israeli treachery.
Key members of the LYNDON JOHNSON administration have long agreed that this attack was no accident. Perhaps most outspoken is former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral THOMAS MOORER. "I can never accept the claim that this was a mistaken attack, " he insists.
Former Secretary of State DEAN RUSK is equally outspoken, calling the attack deliberate in press and radio interviews. Similarly strong language comes from top leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency (some of whose personnel were among the victims), National Security Council, and from presidential advisers such as CLARK CLIFFORD, JOSEPH CALIFANO and LUCIUS BATTLE.This Month in History: The Assault on the USS Liberty Still Covered Up After 26 Years By JAMES M. ENNES Jr.
ENNES ist oben schon als Besatzungsmitglied genannt worden. Er diente 27 Jahre in der Marine und war auf der USS Liberty Lieutenant Im gerade zitierten Bericht bringt er auch Beispiele dafür wie er wegen seiner Forderungen beleidigt wurde.
The language gets worse. Prodigy allows Israel's critics to be called "sodomists," and "derriere bussing antiSemites. " The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, which prints an update on progress toward a congressional investigation every year on the June anniversary of the tragedy, comes in for special vitriol. The magazine is described almost daily as I a hate rag." Yet Prodigy's censors often reject even mild and factual rebuttals of such charges as "insulting. "
Seit dieses Jahr ein neues Buch über die NSA erschienen ist, sehen Israels Erklärungen alt aus. Die Frage, warum denn entgegen offizieller Untersuchungsergebnisse der Angriff absichtlich gewesen sein soll, bekommt eine logisch klingende Antwort. Demnach hat die Liberty ein israelisches Massaker an ägyptischen Gefangenen aus den abgehörten israelischen Funksprüchen erfahren. Das erklärt, warum gerade die Antennen angegriffen wurden. Neu ist auch, daß der israelische Angriff auf die Liberty von einem amerikanischen Spionageflugzeug aufgezeichnet worden sein soll, und dabei auch, daß die Angreifer die Liberty nicht für ein ägyptisches Schiff hielten.
A recently published book, Body of Secrets, by JAMES BAMFORD, claims that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967, was carried out to prevent the United States from eavesdropping on Israeli military activities. According to BAMFORD, an intelligence specialist and the author of a previous best-selling book about the National Security Agency, the NSA had a surveillance plane flying above the Liberty at the time of the attack. Sources mentioned in the book claimed that Israeli pilots sighted an American flag on the unidentified ship.
As for the motive for the attack, BAMFORD speculates in his book that Israel may not have wanted the U.S to know that "at that same moment, a scant dozen or so miles away [at El Arish], Israeli soldiers were butchering civilians and bound prisoners by the hundreds, a fact that the entire Israeli army leadership knew about and condoned, according to the army's own historian."ELLIS SHUMAN The Attack on the USS Liberty
Erwähnt wird dann noch die ablehnende Besprechung in der New York Times, aus der aber bei Salon mehr zitiert wird:
The assault on the USS Liberty
Experts respond to new evidence that the deadly 1967 attack on a U.S. spy ship by Israeli forces was deliberate.
By SUZY HANSEN
April 25, 2001 | While researching "Body of Secrets," his new book on the National Security Agency, JAMES BAMFORD uncovered a cache of records documenting attempts on the part of the JOHNSON administration to cover up the fact that Israeli forces deliberately attacked the USS Liberty, a spy ship, off the coast of Sinai in June 1967, killing 34 sailors and wounding 171 others. BAMFORD also discovered that an American spy plane overheard the attack -- which BAMFORD argues was intended to discourage the U.S. from observing Israeli army activities in the area, including the massacre of Egyptian prisoners -- and captured communications indicating that the Liberty's attackers knew the ship was American. One National Security Agency official told BAMFORD that the attack was portrayed by both the U.S. and the Israeli governments as accidental because "some senior officials in Washington wanted above all to protect Israel from embarrassment." BAMFORD's research adds weight to long-held insider beliefs that the attack was deliberate. Experts on the Middle East respond to an April 23 New York Times article about the revelations.
Soweit sie bei Salon zitiert werden, sind diese Experten ziemlich uninformiert, geben allgemeine Vermutungen ab und sprechen lieber über das politische Umfeld des Vorfalls.
Ambassador DAVID MACK, vice president of the Middle East Institute
[...] but it is my impression [...] that there is very strong evidence that this was a deliberate attack by some part of the Israeli military establishment. The level to which it was authorized, I don't know. [Er weiß angeblich so wenig, daß er in dieser Frage eigentlich kein Experte ist, N.S.]
THOMAS NEUMANN, executive director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
The allegations have been going on for a long time and it's unsubstantiated and probably incorrect. JAMES BAMFORD has attacked Israel before. It's not the first time. He did it in "The Puzzle Palace" and from what I understand -- though I have not personally read the book -- he hasn't come up with any new information. He has added to his anti-Semitic and anti-Israel allegations. [Diese Vorwürfe wurden auch Besatzungsmitgliedern gemacht, die der offiziellen Darstellung widersprachen, N.S.]
BAMFORD's key allegation is that the Israelis bombed the Liberty in order to prevent information from getting out that Israel was winning the 1967 war and, therefore, imposing a cease-fire on Israel. [Das ist nicht das angegebene Motiv für die Bombardierung, N.S.] The only problem with that thesis is that the very same day that the Liberty was bombed there was a headline in the New York Times that said: Israel routs the Arabs, approaches Suez, breaks blockade, occupies old Jerusalem, agrees to U.S. cease-fire and the United Arab Republic rejects the offer. That puts BAMFORD's contention against the headline in the New York Times that makes his contention irrational. He's just reiterating allegations. It's unsubstantiated stuff. BAMFORD doesn't come to the table as a clean scholar. He comes to the table having made these kinds of charges against Israel in the past.
Ambassador RICHARD MURPHY, senior fellow for the Middle East, Council on Foreign Relations
I don't know what [BAMFORD] brought in as new proof. But these are the allegations I've heard over the years, that there was no question that they knew it was an American ship. The Israelis did not want us getting as close as we were getting to the blow-by-blow account of the 1967 war. Israel will probably choose to ignore these allegations. They paid compensation to the victims' families after a lengthy wait. It caused a lot of irritation in the U.S. government that they took so long to settle it. They paid without admission of responsibility or admission that they had any knowledge that the ship was American.
Das Sicherste an der Bombardierung der USS Liberty ist:
Die Toten liegen auf dem Nationalfriedhof Arlington, vgl. Personnel killed on the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) june 8, 1967. Doch die Inschrift der Grabsteine ist umstritten:
Crew member's graves were inscribed, 'died in the Eastern Mediterranean..' as if they had be killed by disease, rather than hostile action.
'The USS Liberty': America's Most Shameful Secret by ERIC S. MARGOLIS May 2, 2001
Ausnahmsweise friedlich endete die Gefangennahme der Besatzung des US-Spionageschiffs Pueblo, das natürlich ebenfalls in internationalen Gewässern gewesen sein soll, durch Nordkorea im Januar 1968. Die Gefangenschaft dauerte 11 Monate. Ich beschränke mich auf einige Links.
(nur Empfehlungen aus Texten im WWW, gelesen habe ich die Bücher nicht)
|In Retrospect :
The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
by BRIAN VANDEMARK (Contributor),
ROBERT S. MCNAMARA
Paperback - 518 pages
Reprint edition (March 1996)
durchschnittliche Kundenwertung: ***
|The War Within :
America's Battle over Vietnam
by TOM WELLS
nur gebraucht lieferbar
|Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
by EDWIN E. MOÏSE
Hardcover (November 1996)
Univ of North Carolina Pr
durchschnittliche Kundenwertung: *****
|The 'Uncensored War' :
The Media and Vietnam
by DANIEL C. HALLIN
Paperback Reprint edition (April 1989)
Univ California Press; ISBN: 052006543
|Body of Secrets :
Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency
from the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century
by JAMES BAMFORD
Hardcover - 721 pages
1 Ed edition (April 24, 2001)
Doubleday; ISBN: 0385499078
durchschnittliche Kundenwertung: ****
|NSA. Die Anatomie des mächtigsten Geheimdienstes der Welt.
von JAMES BAMFORD
Preis: DM 68,00 EUR 34,77
Gebundene Ausgabe - 688 Seiten
Bertelsmann Vlg., M.
durchschnittliche Kundenwertung: ***
|Assault on the Liberty :
The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship
by JAMES M., Jr. ENNES
nur gebraucht lieferbar
Was kann man aus den beiden Vorfällen lernen? Ich weiß es nicht, vielleicht dies:
|vorheriger Tipp||Inhalt||nächster Tipp|